RFR: JDK-8202384: Introduce altserver jvm variant with speculative execution disabled
Magnus Ihse Bursie
magnus.ihse.bursie at oracle.com
Mon Jun 11 07:10:23 UTC 2018
On 2018-06-08 23:50, Erik Joelsson wrote:
> On 2018-06-07 17:30, David Holmes wrote:
>> On 8/06/2018 6:11 AM, Erik Joelsson wrote:
>>> I just don't think the extra work is warranted or should be
>>> prioritized at this point. I also cannot think of a combination of
>>> options required for what you are suggesting that wouldn't be
>>> confusing to the user. If someone truly feels like these flags are
>>> forced on them and can't live with them, we or preferably that
>>> person can fix it then. I don't think that's dictatorship. OpenJDK
>>> is still open source and anyone can contribute.
>> I don't see why --enable-hardened-jdk and --enable-hardened-hotspot
>> to add to the right flags would be either complicated or confusing.
> For me the confusion surrounds the difference between
> --enable-hardened-hotspot and --with-jvm-variants=server, hardened and
> making the user understand it. But sure, it is doable. Here is a new
> webrev with those two options as I interpret them. Here is the help text:
> --enable-hardened-jdk enable hardenening compiler flags for all jdk
> libraries (except the JVM), typically disabling
> speculative cti. [disabled]
> enable hardenening compiler flags for
> hotspot (all
> jvm variants), typically disabling
> speculative cti.
> To make hardening of hotspot a runtime choice,
> consider the "hardened" jvm variant instead
> of this
> option. [disabled]
> Note that this changes the default for jdk libraries to not enable
> hardening unless the user requests it.
> Webrev: http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~erikj/8202384/webrev.04/
Hold it, hold it! I'm not sure how we ended up here, but I don't like it
at all. :-(
I think Eriks initial patch is much better than this. Some arguments in
random order to defend this position:
1) Why should we have a configure option to disable security relevant
flags for the JDK, if there has been no measured negative effect? We
don't do this for any other compiler flags, especially not security
I've re-read the entire thread to see if I could understand what could
possibly motivate this, but the only thing I can find is David Holmes
vague fear that these flags would not be well-tested enough. Let me
counter with my own vague guesses: I believe the spectre mitigation
methods to have been fully and properly tested, since they are
rolled-out massively on all products. And let me complement with my own
fear: the PR catastrophe if OpenJDK were *not* built with spectre
mitigations, and someone were to exploit that!
In fact, I could even argue that "server" should be hardened *by
default*, and that we should instead introduce a non-hardened JVM named
something akin to "quick-but-dangerous-server" instead. But I realize
that a 25% performance hit is hard to swallow, so I won't push this agenda.
2) It is by no means clear that "--enable-hardened-jdk" does not harden
all aspects of the JDK! If we should keep the option (which I definitely
do not think we should!) it should be renamed to
"--enable-hardened-libraries", or something like that. And it should be
on by default, so it should be a "--disabled-hardened-jdk-libraries".
Also, the general-sounding name "hardened" sounds like it might
encompass more things than it does. What if I disabled a hardened jdk
build, should I still get stack banging protection? If so, you need to
move a lot more security-related flags to this option. (And, just to be
absolutely clear: I don't think you should do that.)
3) Having two completely different ways of turning on Spectre protection
for hotspot is just utterly confusing! This was a perfect example of how
to use the JVM features, just as in the original patch.
If you want to have spectre mitigation enabled for both server and
client, by default, you would just need to run "configure
--with-jvm-features=no-speculative-cti", which will enable that feature
for all variants. That's not really hard *at all* for anyone building
OpenJDK. And it's way clearer what will happen, than a
4) If you are a downstream provider building OpenJDK and you are dead
set on not including Spectre mitigations in the JDK libraries, despite
being shown to have no negative effects, then you can do just as any
other downstream user with highly specialized requirements, and patch
the source. I have no sympathies for this; I can't stop it but I don't
think there's any reason for us to complicate the code to support this
So, to recap, I think the webrev as published in
http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~erikj/8202384/webrev.02/ (with "altserver"
renamed to "hardened") is the way to go.
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