Permission Bug in AtomicLongFieldUpdater and AtomicIntegerFieldUpdater
dl at cs.oswego.edu
Fri Apr 16 04:43:48 PDT 2010
On 04/15/10 18:34, Martin Buchholz wrote:
> People are using Atomic field updaters to update fields in classes in other
I think the policy on this awaits interpretation by Jeff
or other members of security team. FWIW, my take is that
if users know that they may cross class loaders, then they
should wrap these in doPrivileged anyway. As in ...
>>>>> Now, they could work around the problem by creating their atomic
>>>>> updater inside a doPrivileged, but probably we intend for them not to
>>>>> have to do that.
>>> That won't work. The doPrivileged doesn't give them any additional
>>> permissions in their code, so it has no affect.
> That's not my understanding. doPrivileged is useful whenever you want to
> perform an operation with permissions checked only on the current stack
> frame, and not on any other code executing up the stack.
But if David is right about this not always sufficing ...
> To be specific it will depend on the exact call stack. In general you'll get
> the least permissions based on your stack. So if application code with no
> permissions calls library code with permissions, the doPrivileged in the
> library code says "only look at my permissions" - and so the call can work.
> But if the application code with no permissions calls doPrivileged then it
> still has no permissions. A doPrivileged by the application code will only
> have an effect if the application code has the necessary permissions but
> there is a frame with fewer permissions further up the stack.
... then it may be necessary to issue the doPriviliged
inside the constructor in all cases, just in case it does
cross class loaders?
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