Update #2: JEP 123: SecureRandom First Draft and Implementation.
bradford.wetmore at oracle.com
Wed Jan 9 00:44:13 PST 2013
Thanks so much for all of the constructive feedback. I wasn't terribly
happy with the previous API proposal, and the comments reflected that.
Sean Mullan came up with a nice API idea which greatly simplifies the
goal of helping applications/deployers select a "strong" SecureRandom
I agree with the comments from Xuelei and Micheal StJohns (and others).
As Xuelei mentioned, the original scoping a year ago included some of
those larger configuration ideas, and Michael gave some great additional
food for thought. With the JDK 8 M6 deadline quickly drawing near, we
unfortunately don't have time to explore this further, but what I'm
proposing should complement and not preclude such future work.
As additional goals for this JEP, I wanted to address three problems in
the current implementation:
1. Many customer escalations/complaints of "slow SecureRandom
performance" because of the limited entropy collection problem on Linux
boxes, and there's much confusion about how to workaround this problem.
2. The documentation/configuration in the java.security file does not
match the implementations, and is very confusing when trying to figure
out #1 above.
3. It's not clear what the four different Oracle JDK SecureRandom
implementations do. (Solution: update the Oracle Security Providers page.)
I think the current proposal addresses these issues.
A Security property called "securerandom.strongAlgorithm". There are
defaults for each supported platform, and deployers can change this
value if they have access to better ones.
static String SecureRandom.getStrongAlgorithm() which obtains the
property. The expected usage:
* SecureRandom sr = SecureRandom.getInstance(
* keyPairGenerator.initialize(2048, sr);
Cleaned out the incorrect information in the java.security files.
The default securerandom.source Security property is set to
"file:/dev/random" to properly reflect the implementation. (Ideally,
I'd like to push this back to earlier JDK's.)
If the java.security.egd/securerandom.source properties are set to
either "file:/dev/random" or "file:/dev/urandom", NativePRNG will be
preferred to SHA1PRNG.
NativePRNG now respects the java.security.egd/securerandom.source
NativePRNG reads seeds from /dev/random and nextBytes from /dev/urandom.
I added two new NativePRNG implementations which are completely
blocking or nonblocking. The "securerandom.strongAlgorithm" property
points to the blocking variant.
I still have some cleanup work to do on the NativePRNG.java file, but
the rest (minus test cases) is ready in the webrev.02 directory.
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